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This week, the Hungarian and Polish governments vetoed the critical elements of
the European Multi-Annual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund that required
the unanimous consent of European Union Member States. Prime Minister Orbán
had been threatening this veto ever since the European Commission proposed to
link the distribution of these funds to comply with the rule of law. The Brussels veto
this week coincided with a domestic legal blitz in Budapest as a major constitutional
amendment, and a flurry of new laws and decrees appeared all at once. The two
legal events are related.
In explaining Hungary’s European veto, Justice Minister Judit Varga (at 16:56)
argued that Hungary was being “sanctioned for ideological deviation even if one
hasn’t broken any rules.” The Hungarian government is indeed expert in appearing
to follow the rules of Hungarian law because it continually adjusts the rules to fit its
behaviour rather than the other way around. The legal blitz at home is designed to
regularize many deeply irregular actions that the government has taken in recent
years because there is now a real threat that someone in Brussels will start looking
closely at whether the Hungarian government’s actions are indeed consistent with
the rule of law, an assessment that would start with whether Hungary is following its
own legal rules.
But because the government is annoyed over this proposed intrusive surveillance
and potential loss of EU funds, some of the new legal initiatives poke thumbs in
Brussels’ eyes. One is designed to elicit criticism so that it will appear that the EU
is ideologically motivated in criticizing Hungary for rule of law violations, and the
other hides the money that the EU will try to trace. Finally, as we will see, Orbán is
beginning the process of rigging the next election by changing the election laws.
Provoking Europe by Attacking LGBTIQ Rights
There is something schizophrenic in the situation when at the same time as the
European Commission launched its ambitious new agenda to ensure LGBTIQ
equality across Europe – not to mention that the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe has also just highlighted that there is signifiable progress in the legal and
social recognition of LGBTIQ in European countries including the EU member states
–, the Hungarian government decided to change its constitution to reject LGBTIQ
rights gratuitously. For years (and even now that the rule of law conditionality
debate has reached a moment of high drama), the Hungarian government has
claimed that all efforts to sanction the country for consolidating power in the hands
of the prime minister and causing the country to fall into the category of “electoral
authoritarian” governments that are only “partly free” resulted from Brussels’ anger
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at the Hungarian government because it refused to take in refugees at the height of
the migration crisis. The government has already found it unacceptable that financial
issues should be tied to migration under the pretext of the rule of law.
But migration is no longer so urgent a crisis in Europe, so it is no longer so credible
that the EU would hold a grudge against Hungary five years later. The Hungarian
governing party, therefore, needs to pick a new and potent ideological fight with
Brussels. Or rather, Hungary needs to assert its Christian and constitutional identity
in a new and provocative way so that any criticism of Hungary for violating the rule of
law will appear to be criticisms based on ideological differences.
The ninth amendment to the Hungarian Fundamental Law announces Fidesz’s
new target: gender ideology and the rights of LGBTIQ people. While the 2011
Fundamental Law already defined marriage as a union of a man and a woman, the
new constitutional amendment extends conventional gender norms to parenthood
by inscribing in the constitution: ’The mother is a woman, the father is a man.’ In
addition, the amendment fixes children’s gender identity at birth so that later gender
changes can never be reflected in the birth register.
Together with the draft 9th Amendment to the Fundamental Law, the government
also introduced an amendment to the Civil Code, stating that only married couples
are eligible to adopt children. This will not only exclude single people, but because
the constitution already bars same-sex marriage, the government’s anti-LGBTIQ
ideology even more importantly bars adoption for same-sex couples. According to
the official explanation of the act, this serves the ’interest of the child,’ as he or she
should have both a mother and a father. The only exception to this rule will be if the
Minister responsible for family policies gives personal permission for single parents.
The details of these changes, and the way that they fit into a long-running campaign
against gender nonconformity are well described in the blogpost written by Tamás
Dombos and Eszter Polgári.
Of course, these provisions will run straight into conflict with both existing European
human rights law and existing European Union law. Under the European Court
of Human Rights’ decision Christine Goodwin v. UK (2002), states must make it
possible for birth registers to be changed when a person’s gender identity does, and
under E.B. v. France (2008), the state may not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation when considering whether a person is eligible to adopt. And it is not just
European human rights law that has been expanding its protection of the principle
of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and sexual identity. Since
1996, discrimination on the basis of sexual identity has been a violation of EU law.
The Commission’s new LGBTIQ initiative is designed to expand protection of gender
identity even more.
Another amendment to the Fundamental Law explains the ideological background of
all these changes in family affairs. This new provision reads “Every child shall have
the right to the protection and care necessary for his or her proper physical, mental
and moral development. Hungary protects children’s right to the gender identity they
were born with and ensures their upbringing based on our national self-identification
and Christian culture.” One can guess based on prior conflicts that the Hungarian
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government has had with EU institutions that the reference to Christian culture is
designed to turn the fight over the rule of law into a Kulturkampf while also turning
the legal point into yet another argument over constitutional identity.
Perhaps to annoy the EU even further and to demonstrate that the Hungarian
government really wants to attack gender equality in any of its forms, the legislative
package unveiled last week would, if passed, abolish the Hungarian Equal
Treatment Authority – an agency whose existence is required by EU law. Instead,
the Hungarian government will merge the jurisdiction of the Equal Treatment
Authority into that of the overloaded and inert Commissioner for Fundamental Rights’
office, virtually guaranteeing that even the anti-discrimination law that remains on the
books in Hungary will get scant enforcement.
And, as the Trafalmadorians in Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five said everytime
there was a death, ’so it goes.’
Hiding the Money
The new European conditionality mechanism will focus on violations of the rule
of law defined broadly to include deficiencies that arise out of endangering the
independence of the judiciary, failing to sanction arbitrary actions by public officials
or limiting the availability of legal remedies. But such deficiencies will only be
actionable when they occur while the Member State in question is administering EU
funds. One of the many compromises that the regulation endured along the way was
to become so linked to EU funds that the abuses of the rule of law have to occur
while EU money is at stake. The consequences of violation, however, are clear.
Funds can be suspended.
How could a government evade sanctions for misuse of EU funds? If the government
could make the EU money disappear from the radar screen before it flows into
unapproved uses, then the money simply becomes impossible to trace to its illegal
ends. The Hungarian government has long been accused of siphoning off public
money into private pockets. But if the new conditionality mechanism will put the
expenditure of EU funds under a microscope, how can the government go on
benefiting its friends while it is under scrutiny?
The new constitutional amendment has a fix for that, and it is very simple. Article 8 of
the amendment says that the following sentence should be added to the constitution:
’Public money is the revenue, expenditure and monetary claims of the state.” Short.
Elegant. And alarming.
The new constitutional definition would be much narrower than the definition of
public funds that courts have used. It would leave out funds that presently flow from
the state into the growing network of ’public foundations’ that the government has
been creating. Under the new definition, once funds enter these foundations, which
are nominally private entities established for public purposes, the funds would cease
being public, which – among other things – means that the state audit office would
stop tracking them and keeping records of what happens to the money. Already
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it is possible to see that the money that flows from the government into the prime
minister’s favorite sports clubs would become non-public as soon as it reached their
hands under this new definition.
But the extent to which public expenditures can be shielded from scrutiny goes
far beyond the money spent on sports clubs. Back in 2014, the Hungarian Central
Bank created a network of public foundations that were given about $25 million
in property and about $1 billion in grants to spend out of the public eye. A court
decision determined that the money given to the foundations were public funds that
had to be disclosed – and the disclosures demonstrated the foundations spend
lavish sums on a college (complete with a wine and cheese shop) that taught the
unusual economic theories of the National Bank president, on pro-government
journalists and on a six-volume patriotic history of Hungary written by an oncologist.
There was a common theme: Most of the beneficiaries were close associates or
family members of the Central Bank president and others in the government’s inner
circle. The scandalous spending of the National Bank’s foundations were exposed by
court decisions that determined that public money given to public foundations had to
spent transparently.
The new constitutional amendment seems designed to prevent money given to the
growing new network of public foundations from having to be disclosed or tracked
by the courts or – for that matter – by the State Audit Office. They are simply defined
away as not being public funds. Money given to the public foundations will be
like money given to the worker on a public contract who builds a bridge. Whether
his salary goes to pay for a new car or for gambling is of no concern to the state.
Now the money was given to the network of public foundations – which, among
other things, includes KESMA (the public foundation to which oligarchs donated
all of their media holdings so that now it controls more than 500 news outlets), the
foundation for the control of Corvinus University and the proposed foundations that
will result from the privatization of the university sector. The government has also
been claiming for some time that the EximBank, Hungary’s state export finance
bank, also did not traffic in public money, so perhaps it too will deemed to have non-
public money.
While the definition of public funds in the new constitutional amendment is not
alone enough to accomplish this massive siphoning of public funds off into various
projects that are not transparent, it is clear that the government is trying to entrench
in the constitution a very narrow definition of public funds so that they can invent a
variety of new legal entities that while being filled with government appointees and
performing public functions will not be using ’public’ money. Such a definition will
avoid the prying eyes of courts and the State Audit Office. And this definition will
mean that when the EU comes calling to figure out what has happened to the money
it has awarded to Hungary, it may not be possible to really figure that out. Just like in
the lyrics of Madness’ song Lola: ’Girls will be boys and boys will be girls/It’s a mixed
up, muddled up, shooked up world except for Lola’.
So it goes.
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Overhauling the election laws in an emergency
On 10 November, one minute before midnight, the government submitted a proposal
to amend the electoral laws (T/13679). Of course, there are outrageous new rules
in the draft law benefiting the governing Fidesz party, such as the rule that allows
voters to take a photo of their already-filled-in ballot papers inside the polling station
to prove that they acted according to the will of those who paid for their votes.
In previous elections Fidesz effectively used electoral clientelism, particularly in
villages, where the only source of living has been public work distributed by mayors.
But the deeper worries are structural.
Hungary has a unicameral Parliament, elected according to a mixed system similar
to Germany’s, but way more disproportional. Fully 106 of the 199 parliamentary
seats are filled in first-past-the-post individual constituencies and the rest are
calculated from qualifying party lists. Voters vote for both an individual constituency
candidate and for a party list. To get public funding as a party, however, it is not
enough to run individual candidates in the constituencies. Funding only flows if a
party qualifies to run a party list.
Against that background, the most important element of this new election law
changes what it takes to qualify for a party list. Under the proposed legislation,
parties can establish national party lists only if they are able to nominate candidates
from their own party in at least 50 out of the 106 constituencies, instead of the
previously required 27. The official justification for this change is to reduce the
number ’pseudo-parties’ that are created purely to get state funding. But the only
pseudo-parties that have qualified in previous elections were those encouraged
by the Orbán government itself with the intention of shaving votes from the real
opposition parties. Do they really need to change the rules to disqualify the parties of
their own creation?
The more probable reason for this new provision becomes clear if you know that
the only way the opposition can win most of the gerrymandered constituencies is
if they put one and only one candidate up against the Fidesz candidate. For years,
when the opposition was ideologically divided and unable to cooperate, Fidesz was
practically assured to win even though the Fidesz candidate only rarely had majority
support.
After two rounds of elections in which Fidesz’s divide and conquer electoral law
meant that Fidesz kept winning parliamentary supermajorities with substantially less
than half of the votes cast as long as the opposition parties all competed against
each other, the opposition parties became more pragmatic. The opposition parties
then began to see that the only way to defeat Fidesz was to work together. In by-
elections and municipal elections in the last several years, the opposition parties
started fielding one joint candidate against a Fidesz opponent. A Jobbik candidate
would be put up against Fidesz in conservative areas and a candidate from one of
the left or centrist parties would compete against Fidesz in the more left/liberal areas.
While these collectively backed candidates haven’t always won, the opposition has
won more elections overall than it did without these tactical agreements. Preparing
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unusually early for the next national election in 2022, six opposition parties agreed
on a common strategy in August 2020 to unite behind a single candidate in each
individual constituency. This move threatens Orbán’s domination more than any
other domestic political development in the last 10 years.
It is clear that the intent of the new election law is to make this cooperation very
expensive for the opposition parties. If each party wants separate party list funding,
it has to put up 50 candidates in the constituencies. Joint candidates threaten the
ability of each party to run its own list. Fidesz clearly hoped that this move would
destroy cooperation among the opposition parties and send them back toward the
system of party-before-country that brought Fidesz supermajority victories in 2014
and 2018.
Perhaps the new legislation can backfire, however. The 2019 municipal elections
demonstrated for all non-Fidesz voters that the only chance to beat Fidesz is the
united action of the opposition. Under the new rules, however, the six opposition
parties can set up two national lists, one for the left-leaning and another for the right-
leaning parties. This way all of them would be able to have their own parliamentary
fractions and each could still put up at least 50 candidates, while still agreeing not
to compete against each other. Even the proposed new party financing rules would
not disadvantage two national lists. Of course, the left-leaning parties have found it
difficult to cooperate with each other, even without Jobbik in the picture, so whether
the left can set aside its differences to unify in a single party list is anyone’s guess.
The tactical cooperation agreement of August 2020 imagined cooperating only in the
individual constituencies, not joining together to form common party lists.
If prior elections are any guide, however, this will not be the last election law on the
agenda before Orbán has to face the voters again. The individual constituencies
must be, by law, adjusted after ten years, so redistricting is on the agenda in 2021.
And there may well be more tweaks to the election framework in the run-up to 2022
because Orbán is determined not to lose. But this first election law of the 2022
election season shows that Orbán is already strategizing about how to wrong-foot
the opposition so that he alone can win an election, even after all he has done to
harm the country’s constitutional order.
So it goes.
Our review of the new constitutional amendment and legislative package currently
before the Parliament raises an obvious question: Can something already dead
be killed many times over? The answer is yes if you are a Trafalmadorian. And the
answer is yes if you are a Hungarian constitutional democrat.
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